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THE EFFECT OF INSOLVENCY ON EQUITABLE
RELIEF
THE BAsIS OF EQUITY JURISDICTION.
ALTHOUGH the origins of equity jurisdiction have been vari-
L ously defined, it is generally agreed that one of its most
fundamental bases was the necessity of supplementing with
more flexible forms of relief the rigid remedies of the com-
mon law; that is, where the legal remedy was inadequate.'
Were it not for statements of legal authors and decisions of
courts to the contrary,2 it might well be assumed that hardly
'This was originally true in both the exclusive and concurrent jurisdictions
and'is still true in the concurrent jurisdiction. Earl of Oxford's Case, 1 Ch.
Rep. 1, 4-11 (1616) ; 3 Br_ CoM. (2d ed. 1884) 434, 436 (as to the concurrentjurisdiction); MAITLAND, EQUITY (3d ed. 1927) 6-11; 1 POMEROY, EQUITY
JURISPRUDENCE (4th ed. 1918) §§ 62, 219-221; 2 STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE'
(14th ed. 1918) § 718; 1 HIGH, INJUNcTIONs (4th ed. 1905) § 28; Bitterman v.
Louisville & N. R. R., 207 U. S. 205, 28 Sup. Ct. 91 (1907) ; Seymour v.
Delancy, 3 Cow. 445 (N. Y. 1824); Thomas v. Mutual Prot. Union, 121 N. Y.
45, 24 N. E. 24 (1890); Bomeisler v. Forster, 154 N. Y. 229, 48 N. E. 534
(1897) ; Livingston v. Painter, 28 How. Pr. 517, 520 (N. Y. 1865) ; Parker v.
Garrison, 61 Ill. 250 (1871).
There are, of course, other bases of the equity jurisdiction, e.g., affording
a forum for poor complainants. See BAILDON, SELECT CASES IN CHANCERY
(1896) (especially cases 6 (1388) and 43 (tem. Ric. II, 1377-1399)).
The fact that there is no legal remedy at law does not necessarily and of
itself give the court of equity jurisdiction. Rutland Marble Co. v. Ripley, 10
Wall. 339 (U. S. 1870) ; nor need equity always restrain its hand even though
damages can be calculated, for plaintiff cannot, for example, be compelled to
surrender his property to defendant. Gregory v. Nelson, 41 Cal. 278 (1871) ;
cf. Meyer v. Phillips, 97 N. Y. 485 (1884) ; see remarks of Jessel, M. R., in
Smith v. Smith, 20 Eng. L. & Eq. R. 500 (1875) (even after Lord Cairn's Act).
Similarly, in cases of the concurrent jurisdiction, as accident, mistake or
fraud, equity may grant relief irrespective of the existence of an adequate
remedy at law. McCrea v. Purmont, 16 Wend. 460 (N. Y. 1836). Contra:
1 POMEROY, sipra, at 139. Irreparable injury means inadequacy of the legal
remedy. Litchfield-Spear v. Queen Anne's Gate Syndicate (No. 2) Ltd., 1 Ch.
407 (1919) ; Kent, C., in Jerome v. Ross, 7 Johns. 315, 331 (N. Y. 1823);
Baron v. Korn, 127 N. Y. 224, 27 N. E. 804 (1891). The determination of
whether the legal remedy is adequate lies in the discretion of the court. Blair
v. Sup. Council, 208 Pa. 262, 57 Atl. 564 (1904) ; In re Seymour, 124 U. S. 200,
8 Sup. Ct. 482 (1888); cf. U. S. JuD. CODE (1911) § 267 (formerly Judiciary
Act of Sept. 24, 1789, c. 20, § 16. This provision is only declaratory. Boyce
v. Grundy, 3 Pet. 210, 215 (U. S. 1830)).
For a concise description of the exclusive and concurrent jurisdictions,
see 1 POMEROY, supra, §§ 137-140. In the exclusive jurisdiction the primary
right violated is purely equitable, and the remedial right is likewise purely
equitable; in the concurrent jurisdiction the same kind of relief is given as at
law, i.e., when the legal remedy is inadequate. Of course, it is unnecessary in
this connection to consider the auxiliary jurisdiction.
'Blank v. La Montaigne. 123 Misc. 238, 205 N. Y. Supp. 45 (1924) : see
WILLISTON, SALES (2d ed. 1924) §§ 143, 144; (1901) 1 COL. L. REv. 267.
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any thesis of the law is less open to question than that the
recovery of a judgment which the defendant is unable to sat-
isfy will not redress the injury which he has caused to the
plaintiff; that is, that the legal remedy of a judgment against
an insolvent defendant is not adequate. 3 Yet in some cases
equitable relief is denied although the defendant is insolvent,4
in others relief is granted because he is insolvent," in others
relief is denied because he is insolvent,' in others relief is
granted although he is insolvent,7 and in still others the ques-
tion of his solvency is regarded as immaterial.8 It will be
the aim of this paper to discuss the reasons for such strange
incongruities of legal philosophy, and to suggest a possible
solution.
In the case of contracts concerning the purchase or sale
of land, the doctrine of inadequacy as the basis of the equity
jurisdiction has crystallized 9 into a legal rule,'0 regardless
'Hodgson v. Duce, 2 Jur. (N. s.) 1014 (1856), involved a bill for injunc-
tion to restrain repeated trespasses on plaintiff's property; Sir J. Stuart, V.C.:
"It had been suggested that for these trespasses an adequate remedy might be
had at law * * * Unquestionably, a court of law would award damages in such
a case, but damages against whom? The defendant is a pauper, and as against
persons in her position such a form of redress would be the merest mockery
of justice."
"Thompson v. Allen County, 115 U. S. 551, 14 Sup. Ct. 196 (1885);
Munger v. Albany State Bank, 85 N. Y. 580 (1881) ; Speare v. Cutter, 5 Barb.
486 (N. Y. 1849) ; Nessle v. Reese, 19 Abb. Pr. 240, 29 How. Pr. 382 (1865);
Warlier v. Williams, 53 Neb. 143, 73 N. W. 539 (1897).
'Zimmerman v. Gerzog, 13 App. Div. 210, 43 N. Y. Supp. 339 (2d Dept.
1897); Petrolia Mfg. Co. v. Jenkins, 29 App. Div. 403, 51 N. Y. Supp. 1028(1st Dept. 1898) ; Speare v. Cutter, 5 Barb. 486 (N. Y. 1849); Ran v. Seiden-
berg, 53 Misc. 386, 104 N. Y. Supp. 798 (1907); see Doty v. Doty, 171 N. Y.
Supp. 852 (1918) (damages against insolvent defendant deemed inadequate;
yet they would also have been inadequate agairist a solvent defendant) ; Walker
v. Walker, 51 Ga. 22 (1874); Kerlin v. West, 4 N. J. Eq. 499 (1844); 5
PomEROY, op. cit. supra note 1, §§ 1911, 1931, n.38; 1 AMEs, CASES ON EQUITY
JURISPRUDENCE (1904) 524, n.2.
,City Fire Ins. Co. v. Olmsted, 33 Conn. 476 (1866); see Chafee v.
Sprague, 16 R. I. 189, 13 Att. 121 (1886) ; see WILLIsToN, Co TRLcrs (1937)§ 1420.1 Hurley v. A. T. & S. F. Ry., 213 U. S. 126, 29 Sup. Ct. 466 (1909);
Sieg. v. Greene, 225 Fed. 955 (C. C. A. 8th, 1915), wherein delivery, less than
four months prior to bankruptcy, of bricks manufactured with defendant's
money, was held not to be a preference.
a Fur & Wool Trading Co., Ltd. v. Fox, Inc., 245 N. Y. 215, 107 N. E.
670 (1927) (action for an accounting and to impress a trust); Blank v. La
Montaigne' 123 Misc. 238, 205 N. Y. Supp. 45 (1924).
O "*** The doctrine is settled that in contracts for the purchase and sale
of land, damages are inadequate, and this general rule would not yield to the
special circumstances of a particular case", Poamoy, SPEcIrIc PERFORMANCE
OF CO NMACrS (3d ed. 1926) § 27 at 90.
"In this article the expression "legal rule' is used in the sense of a rule
applicable to both law and equity.
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of circumstances, because land is historically regarded as
unique and irreplaceable; and the vendor's right of specific
performance against the purchaser, although attempts have
been made to rationalize it," has also attained the judicial
sanctity of a legal rule because of the doctrine of affirmative
mutuality. In the case of contracts concerning unique per-
sonal property some courts seem regrettably reluctant, al-
though giving lip service to the doctrine enunciated in Duke
of Somerset v. Cookson 12 and adopted by the United States
Supreme Court in Mechanic's Bank v. Seton ' 5 -that the
ground of equity jurisdiction there also is based upon the
impossibility of arriving, at least with any reasonable degree
of certainty, at a legal measure of damage at all-to apply
the doctrine to the cases before them.'4
'Ames, Mutuality in Specific Performance (1903) 3 COL. L. REv. 1;
Horack, Insolvency and Specific Performance (1918) 31 HARV. L. REv. 702.
'3 P. Wins. 390 (1735).
" 1 Pet. 299 (U. S. 1828).
"4 The New York courts have usually either confined the granting of relief
to cases where other grounds for equitable relief were present or have found
that the legal remedy was adequate, and have therefore declined to grant
specific performance. Thus Johnson v. Brooks, 93 N. Y. 337 (1883), a case
frequently stressed and the only New York case cited in 5 AMERICAN AND
ENGLISH ANNOTATED CASES, 269n. on the general doctrine, was a case of the
enforcement of an agreement to purchase stock made by an agent to whom the
money for the purpose had been given by the plaintiff. Other cases, the deci-
sions of which are explainable on varying grounds, are Menier v. Donald, 98
Misc. 684, 165 N. Y. Supp. 50 (1917) involving a contract for sale of a ship,
said by the court to be, perhaps, personal property of a "special kind"; see also
Clark v. Flint, 22 Pick. 238 (Mass. 1839). Cushman v. Thayer Co., 76 N. Y.
365 (1879) (judgment directing transfer of stock on books of defendant cor-
poration) ; Schwartz v. Marjolet, Inc., 214 App. Div. 530, 212 N. Y. Supp. 464
(1st Dept. 1925) (trust relationship between plaintiff, an agent, and defendant,
a principal, who had agreed to deliver stock as partial compensation for services
rendered); Topken v. Schwartz, 223 App. Div. 328, 227 N. Y. Supp. 561 (19t
Dept. 1928) (the reverse of the situation in the previous case), where employer
corporation was held entitled to recover stock previously given to employee and
agreed by him to be surrendered on termination of his employment; the decree
was reversed in 249 N. Y. 206. 163 N. E. 206 (1928) because not mutually
binding; Scruggs v. Cotterall, 67 App. Div. 583, 73 N. Y. Supp. 882 (1st Dept.
1902) (option agreement between holders of a majority of shares of stock to
purchase stock of deceased share-holder) ; Matter of Petition of Argus Co., 138
N. Y. 557, 34 N. E. 388 (1893) (contra to Scruggs case) ; Winchester v. Sim-
mons, 222 App. Div. 639, 227 N. Y. Supp. 408 (1st Dept. 1928) (fraud in sale
of stock represented to be completely owned by defendant corporation) ; Ran v.
Seidenberg, 53 Misc. 386, 104 N. Y. Supp. 798 (1907) (promoter-investor rela-
tionship) ; Bailey v. Colleen Products Corp., 120 Misc. 297, 198 N. Y. Supp. 418
(1923) (same situation except that the corporation had adopted the promoter's
contract).
The New York courts readily found adecuate legal relief to be present in
Clements v. Sherwood-Dunn, 108 App. Div. 327, 95 N. Y. Supp. 766 (1st Dept.
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Tm NATURE, OF CONTRACT R IGHTS.
A necessary preliminary inquiry is whether a party to
a contract is entitled to the performance stipulated for, or
whether the payment of damages by the party who has broken
the contract is an alternative privilege of the wrong-doer. 15
The easy morality of the latter view has never appealed to
1905), aff'd, 187 N. Y. 521, 79 N. E. 1102 (1907) ; Col. & So. R. R. v. Blair,
214 N. Y. 497, 108 N. E. 840 (1914); Batemen v. Strauss, 86 App. Div. 540,
83 N. Y. Supp. 785 (2d Dept. 1903); Gilbert v. Bunnell, 92 App. Div. 284,
86 N. Y. Supp. 1123 (1st Dept. 1904); Kennedy v. Thompson, 97 App. Div.
296, 89 N. Y. Supp. 963 (2d Dept. 1904) ; Ehrich v. Grant, 111 App. Div. 196,
97 N. Y. Supp. 600 (1st Dept. 1905); Rawll v. Baker-Vawter Co., 187 App.
Div. 330, 176 N. Y. Supp. 189 (1st Dept. 1919) (remedy of replevin found
adequate, although Statute of Limitations had run); see also Williams v.
Montgomery, 148 N. Y. 519, 43 N. E. 57 (1896), where the time for specific
performance had expired; although during this unsettled period, the Court of
Appeals in Butler v. Wright, 186 N. Y. 259, 78 N. E. 1002 (1906) had decided,
as the result of an erroneous finding of fact by the Appellate Division, that as
matter of law specific performance can be granted in the case of a contract to
sell stock. The result of this confusion can be seen in Clark v. Burroughs
Asphalt Co., 97 Misc. 662, 157 N. Y. Supp: 581 (1916), where the court, in
denying, partly on the ground of laches, specific performance of a contract to
purchase all the defendant's cement requirements from plaintiff's factory, said
that "specific performance is discretionary with the court and should not be
granted to enforce a contract to purchase property simply because the damages
are uncertain or contingent."
The correct principle was both stated and applied in Waddle v. Cabana,
220 N. Y. 18, 114 N. E. 1054 (1917) under circumstances, however (stock
having no ascertainable value, nearly all, 4,989 out of 5,000 shares being owned
by one man and obtainable only from him as a favor and for special reasons)
which would render the decision distinguishable from most other situations
likely to arise unless the New York courts are courageous enough to break
away from the spirit of the earlier cases.
Section 149, New York Personal Property Law, passed in 1911, has appar-
ently not enlarged the common law rule; see Rawll v. Baker-Vawter, 187 App.
Div. 330, 176 N. Y. Supp. 189 (1st Dept. 1919), holding that a suit for specific
performance of a contract for the sale of personal property will not lie except
under exceptional circumstances. The holding sounds like a reversion to the
early dictum, uttered long before the statute, in Livingston v. Painter, 28 How.
Pr. 517, 520 (N. Y. 1865) that "It is now settled that the rule that the specific
performance of a contract relating to chattels will not be decreed, is limited to
cases where a compensation in damages would furnish a complete and satisfac-
tory remedy."
'"Professor Beale in his treatise on the CONFLICT OF LAWS, has stated in
convincing fashion the classification of rights as static and protective; see
1 BEALE, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1935) § 8 A.11, and pp. 68, 78, 82, and 290.
Cf. 2 BL., op. cit. supra note 1, at 438: "The primary right to a satisfaction for
injuries is given by the law of nature, and the suit is only the means of ascer-
taining and recovering that satisfaction." The remedial or protective rights,
according to Professor Beale, are the rights to sue and to be satisfied. See also
Pound, The Theory of JTudicial Decision (1922) 36 HARv. L. REV. 641, 647.
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the conceptions of. ethics of the Continental 16 or Scotch 17
jurists, and although the view is hinted at in some of the
earlier English decisions,18 it is now definitely discarded.10
However, the fact that a party is ideally entitled to perfor-
mance in kind does not mean that such a right will be en-
forced by equity in all cases.20  It is only where the con-
siderations opposed to the awarding of a decree of specific
performance, such as the objection of the necessity for con-
tinuous supervision, 21 the reluctance to impose involuntary
servitude,2 2 the distaste of imposing restrictions on economic
competition, 3 the undesirability of eliminating a jury trial,24
or the burden on the defendant, 25 the public 28 or other credi-
18 1 DEMOLOMBE, TRAIT DES CONTRATS (2d ed.) 486, cited in (1895) 9
HARV. L. REv. 72, 78; Neitzel, Specific Performance, Injunctions, and Damages
it the German Law (1909) 22 HARV. L. REv. 161.
'Stewart v. Kennedy, 15 A. C. 75, 102, 105 (1897). On the continent of
Europe and in Scotland, specific performance is allowed without any limitations
other than those which the circumstances of the case necessarily impose.
'Lord Coke advanced the denial of the defendant's right to an alternative
election to pay damages, as a reason for refusing specific performance of a con-
tract to make a lease. See Bromage v. Genning, 1 Rolle 368 (1616), cited in
1 AMES, op. cit. supra note 5, at 38n. For a powerful expression of the view
contrary to that of the text, see Holmes, The Path of the Law (1897) 10 HARV.
L. REV. 457, 462.
See WILLISTON, Op. cit. supra note 6, § 1339; Gardner, An Inquiry into
the Principles of the Law of Contracts (1922) 46 HARV. L. REv. 1, 16, 26;
Horack, Insolvency and Specific Performance (1918) 31 HARV. L. REv. 702,
703; Langdell, A Brief Survey of Equity Jurisdiction (1887) 1 H~Av. L. REv.
70, 71. Contra: Gollew v. Bacon, 1 Bulst. 112 (1611), cited in 1 CxArXE AND
SIMPsoN, CASES ON EQUITY (1934) 245, 246, n.1. For the best discussion of the
history of specific performance see 1 HOLDSWORTir, HISTORY OF ENGLISHr LAW
(4th ed. 1927) 455, 457, also 321, 324. See also 2 Coo, CASES ON EQUITY (2d
ed. 1932) 1-4.
(Rutland) Marble Co. v. Ripley, 10 Wall. 339 (U. S. 1870).
2 Id. at 358.
Mary Clark's Case, 1 Blackf. 122 (Ind. 1821).
' For a clear statement of the contrasting interests of the plaintiff and of
the public, see Digges, J., in Deuerling v. City Baking Co., 155 Md. 280, 284-
289, 141 N. E. 542 (1928).
Gollew v. Bacon, 1 Bulst. 112 (1611); see Simms v. Burnette, 55 Fla.
702, 46 So. 90 (1928). The elimination of a trial by jury is not a constitutional
objection, Walker v. Sarravint, 92 U. S. 90 (1875), as no such right ever
existed where the remedy was by injunction, People v. Elmore, 256 N. Y. 489,
493, 177 N. E. 14 (1931). See Lynch v. Metro. Ry., 129 N. Y. 274, 279,
29 N. E. 315 (1891); CHAFEE, CASES ON EQUITABLE RELIEF AGAINST TORTS
(1924) 257, n.1, cases cited., The statutory and constitutional provisions
against imprisonment for debt prevent enforcing through contempt proceedings
an equity decree for the payment of a money obligation arising out of contract.
Conger v. R. R., 120 N. Y. 29, 23 N. E. 983 (1890) ; Clarke v. Rochester,
etc., R. R., 18 Barb. 350 (N. Y. 1854).
" See note 23, sup-ra.
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tors,2 7 for example, are outweighed by the fact that the fre-
quently illusory satisfaction of damages will obviously prove
to be inadequate in the instant case,.that equity will award a
decree of specific performance.
On the question as to what is meant by adequacy, courts
and text-writers have frequently differed,2 8 and the Supreme
Court of the United States has changed its mind.29 The,
New York courts also have wavered considerably before ar-
riving at a uniform conclusion.30  It is however becoming
less and less unpopular to question the soundness of the
See Munger v. Albany State Bank, 85 N, Y. 580, 593 (1881).
= In the following cases, treatises, and articles, the question was discussed
from the viewpoint of the problem presented by the defendant's insolvency:
Doty v. Doty, 171 N. Y. Supp. 852 (1918) (remedy found inadequate) ; Blank
v. La Montaigne, 123 Misc. 238, 205 N. Y. Supp. 45 (1924) (specific per-
formance denied-"The ability to bring an action and 'recover judgmeftt deter-
mines the adequacy of the legal remedy, irrespective of the ability to collect on
that judgment."); McClintock, Adequacy of Ineffective Remedy at Law (1931)
16 MINN. L. REv. 233 (remedy deemed inadequate); (1931) 21 Ky. L. J. 464;
(1931) 22 Ky. L. J. 1, and (1936) 24 Ky. L.-J. 318 (remedy deemed ade-
quate) ; 5 POMEROY, op. cit. supra note 1, (re specific performance-remedy
deemed adequate; but cf. 5 PomEabY, § 1911 (remedy inadequate re torts);
1 LAWRENcE, EQuiy JURISPRUDENCE (1929) § 265 (remedy found adequate
in specific performance cases; but see § 79 (inadequate in tort cases); 5
POMERoY, supra, § 2171 at 4882, n.35. "* * * The inadequacy 'of the legal relief
which is the basis of equitable remedies is ordinarily in the nature of that relief
in cases of a certain type, not in the difficulty of collection of damages in the
individual instances."
' Compare Thompson v. Allen County,- 115 U. S. 550, 554 (1885) ("The
want of a remedy and the inability to obtain the fruits of a remedy, are quite
distinct") with Terrance v. Thompson, 263 U. S. 197,' 214, 44 Sup. Ct. 15(1923) ("But the legal remedy must be as complete, practical and efficient as
that which equity could afford"). In accord with Thompson v. Allen County,
supra, see Tampa R. R. v. Mulhern, 73 Fla. 146, 74 So. 297 (1917) ; McGann
v. LaBrecque Co., 91 N. J. Eq. 307, 109 At1. 501 (1920) ; Preston v. Sturgis
Milling Co., 183 Fed. 1 (C. C. A. 6th, 1910), cert. denied, 220 U. S. 610,
31 Sup. Ct. 714 (1911). Contra: Lyman v. Suburban R. R., 190 Ill. 320, 330,
60 N. E. 315 (1901); Clark v. Flint, 22 Pick. 231, 238 (Mass. 1839); Yar-
borough v. Thornton, 147 Ala. 221, 42 So. 402 (1906) (collection of purchase
money by insolvent grantor who has conveyed, with warranty, a title which
had failed, enjoined). "
I The old New York view was that the remedy is adequate if it is in its
nature fitted to the end in view, even though it means a failure to produce the
money. Nessle v. Reese, 19 Abb. Pr. 240 (N. Y. 1865) (insolvency not a ground
of equity jurisdiction where contract provided for liquidated damages). Accord:
Duffy v. Lodebush, 173 App. Div. 205, 159 N. Y. Supp. 299 (2d Dept. 1916).
The present New York view is exemplified by Zeiser v. Cohn, 207 N. Y. 407,
422, 101 N. E. 184 (1913), where insolvency was stated to be an important
consideration. The opinion cites Mills v. Bliss, 55 N. Y. 139, 142 (1873). See
to the same effect, Speare v. Cutter, 5 Barb. 486, 489 (N. Y. 1849) ; Mulry v.
Norton, 100 N. Y. 424, 438, 3 N. E. 581, 587 (1885) (an action to quiet title--
"The evidence also tended to show that the defendant Levy was a person of
little pecuniary responsibility and presumably unable to respond in damages for
the injury his conduct was liable to inflict upon the plaintiff's rights").
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theory that an uncollectible judgment is adequate compensa-
tion to a person whose contract has been broken.31
It should be noted that inadequacy is only one of various
objections to the completeness of the alternative remedy of
damages. Indefiniteness, 32 which is present when damages
cannot be satisfactorily measured by any practicable stan-
dard, and difficulty of calculation, 33 which exists where dam-
ages would be speculative or conjectural, are also grounds
for passing to the primary right of the injured party and en-
forcing it. We are by no means entering terrain, incognitam
when we question the completeness of the legal remedy on
the ground of insolvency.34
THE EFFECT OF INSOLVENCY ON INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
AGAINST TORTS.
The subject of the effect of insolvency on equitable rights
must necessarily be considered from the separate points of
approach of injunctive relief against torts and specific per-
formance of contracts. Assuming the correctness of the mod-
ern definition of adequacy, there would appear to be no sat-
isfactory reason why the presence of the element of insolvency
should not permissibly be used as a determinant in control-
ling the decision of the court to award injunctive relief.
Whether in such a case the presence of this factor is the basis
'See Mulry v. Norton, 100 N. Y. 424, 3 N. E. 581 (1885) ; McClintock,
loc. cit. supra note 28; cf. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1937) §361 (d): "In
determining the adequacy of the remedy of damages, the following factors are
influential * * * the degree of probability that damages awarded cannot in fact
be collected."
'Roseberg v. Am. Hotel Co., 95 N. J. Eq. 640, 121 Atl. 9 (1923).
'Minnes v. Nebro, 174 Mich. 635, 642, 140 N. W. 980 (1913) ; Lowrie v.
Castle, 225 Mass. 37, 113 N. E. 206 (1916); Cushman v. Thayer Mfg. Co.,
76 N. Y. 365 (1879).
SNote MARYLAND ANN. CODE (Bagby, 1924) art. XVI, § 246, which
forbids the court to deny specific performance on the mere ground that the
legal remedy is adequate, unless the defendant posts a bond or makes an
equivalent showing of property owned.
Section 149, New York Personal Property Law, is a statute giving dis-
cretion to allow specific performance where it is for any reason a superior form
of relief. It was derived from Section 68, Uniform Sales Act, largely derived
in turn from Section 52 of the English Sale of Goods Act, and appears to
enlarge the legal principles applicable and might permit more readily the award-
ing of specific performance in cases of insolvency. There would seem to be no
objection, under fusion, to further extending equity jurisdiction.
[ VOL. 13
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of jurisdiction 35 or merely an element in inducing the court
to exercise its discretion 36 is largely, it is submitted with
deference to those who have emphasized the distinction, a
question of verbiage rather than of difference in intellectual
concept. If A, B and C are necessary points of support of a
raised triangle placed parallel to the ground, and if one apex
of the triangle will fall without its particular support, all
of the supports are necessary; even though we have two of
them, the presence of the third is required. Similarly, if for
example the court will ordinarily refuse specific performance
of a contract for the sale of a commodity which, although
actually unique, can be replaced substantially, but will grant
specific performance if the plaintiff cannot get from the de-
fendant the money with which to procure even a substan-
tially similar replacement, the factor of insolvency is in fact
a jurisdictional element, by whatever name it is called. What
is meant by the particular distinction is not whether insol-
vency is a jurisdictional element or merely one which may
induce the exercise of the chancellor's discretion, but whether
or not it is the sole jurisdictional element necessary. On this
point, whatever might be the ideally desirable answer if we
recognize the right to specific performance as the plaintiff's
primary right in all cases of contracts for the sale of chattels,
the answer on the authorities must be up to the present time
definitely in the negative3 7 however "probably desirable" 38
such a theory might be.
Reverting to the problem of the effect of insolvency on
equitable relief against torts, the courts and text-writers
have recognized this as a controlling 39 factor in the impor-
tant heads of trespass, 40 waste 41 and actions in the nature of
waste. 42  In such cases no one is injured by the granting of
See Horack, supra note 11.
See Pound, The Progress of the Law (1920) 33 HARv. L. Rav. 420, 429.
'Livesley v. Johnston, 45 Ore. 30, 76 Pac. 13 (1904).
' WALSH, EQUITY (2d ed. 1937) 319.
'See 5 PomERoY, op. cit. supra note 1, § 497.
'See 1 AMES, op. cit. supra note 5, n.2, cases cited; 5 PomEROY, op. cit.
supra note 1, § 497, and note 26 in that section.
'CHAFEE, op. cit. supra note 24, at 9; 1 AMES, op. cit. supra note 5, at
461, n.1.
Electric Construction Co. v. Heffernan, 34 N. Y. St. Rep. 436, 12 N. Y.
Supp. 336 (1890) ; 1 AMES, op. cit. supra note 5, at 533, n.1 (asportation of
slaves).
1938 ]
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injunctive relief; 43 the plaintiff is protected in his property
rights; 11 the sensibilities of the chancellor are in no danger
of being ruffled, and the plaintiff, is spared the shock of being
informed that a judgment which it will be impossible.to col-
lect-is an adequate compensation for the loss or deprivation
of the use of his property.
In many tort situations the question of the right to in-
junctive relief might well turn on whether the legal remedy
is inadequate 'ss matter of law, even if damages are cal-
culable 'and recoverable; otherwise stated, the problem is,
has the original basis of equity jurisdiction of inadequacy of
remedy crystallized, as in the cases of injunction against
waste14 5 into a theory which regards damages as inadequate
as matter of 1a4o? 'In such cases the presence of insolvency
"adds no additional weight; on the other hand, the -factor of
insolvency is nbt a reason for denying-relief, because no one
else is prejudiced: In the case of ordinary trespass, where
the equity jurisdiction, has not become thus crystallized, in-
solvency might well be regarded as the" controlling factor.
As has been 'stated, no one will be injured if it is so treated.
This result has been reached in New York with regard to the
threatened asportation of a non-unique chattel. 46  When the
chattel is unique or has been severed from the realty, dam-
ages are regarded as inadequate even though the defendant
be solvent; insolvency is, therefore, in such a situation, im-
material.
Equity will ordinarily refuse to enjoin a trespass 47 un-
1 AmES, ap. cit. mupra note 5, at 524, n.2; see 5 PomERoy,' oc. cit. mipra
note 40.
"An owner of property should not be obliged to part with it, even though
the loss is measurable in money. Gregory v. Nelson, 41 Cal. 278 (1871);
Smith v. Smith, 20 Eng. L. & Eq. R. 500 (1875).
"SVane v. Lord Barnard, 2 Vern. 738 (1716); Rolt v. Lord Somerville,
2 Eq. Cas. Abr. 759, pl. 8 (1737); Cairns v. Chabert, 3 Edw. Ch. 312 (1839) ;
Lane v. Newdigate (per Lord Eldon), 10 Ves. 192 (1804) (negative injunc-
tion).
"Electric Construction Co. v. Heffernan, 34 N. Y. St. Rep. 436, 12 N. Y.
Supp. 336 (1890); Speare v. Cutter, 5 Barb. 486 (N. Y. 1849) ; the court based
its decision on the multiplicity of suits theory. But where defendant was not
insolvent, similar relief was thought inappropriate in Watson v. Hunter, 5
Johns. Ch. 168, 172 (1821) (dictiom).
41 Equity will usually refuse to enjoin a trespass which is not in the nature
of waste, 14 R. C. L. (1916) 442; Gates v. Johnson, 172 Mass. 495, 52 N. E.
136 (1899) ; Note (1924) 32 A. L. R. 463, 464.
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less it is a continuing one 48 or a multiplicity of suits would
otherwise be necessary.49 In such cases the element of ir-
reparable injury required as a basis for awarding relief means
the same thing as inadequacy of the legal remedy. Even if
damages can be calculated in the case, for example, of a
continuing trespass, the plaintiff cannot be compelled-to sur-
render his property to the defendant. In such situations
also, therefore, the question of defendant's possible insol-
vency is immaterial, the law having pronounced its formula
that damages would be inadequate even if collectible.
Asportation of unique chattels will ordinarily be en-
joined,50 on the same principle that leads to the specific en-
forcement of contracts to sell unique chattels. If the chattel
is not unique, the owner is remitted to his legal remedy.
Waste is. ordinarily enjoined. 1 In all of the foregoing
cases where equitable relief is granted, the inadequacy of the
legal remedy must be pleaded, and on the question of ade-
quacy the equity court's decision is final.5 2
Within the general boundaries of the foregoing situa-
tions are cases such as those of a single and non-continuing
trespass, asportation of a non-unique chattel, and,. in juris-
dictions where the rule of inadequacy has not become crystal-
lized, waste where the legal remedy would be adequate In
such situations injunctive relief is ordinarily denied. 3  In
all of these and similar situations, the factor of the defen-
dant's insolvency, might well determine the granting of in-
junctive relief.
THE EFFECT OF INSOLVENCY ON SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.
In the field of specific performance, however, the inquiry
involves considerations which, whatever the conclusion ulti-
Eno v. Christ, 25 Misc. 24, 54 N. Y. Supp. 400 (1898).
"See 5 PomaaoY, op. cit. supra note 1, § 1910, n.22; Note (1924) 32 A. L.
R. 463, 465, 448-450.
' See Watson v. Hunter, 5 Johns. Ch. 168, 169 (N. Y. 1821) ; cf. Speare v.
Cutter, 5 Barb. 486 (N. Y. 1849), where defendant was insolvent and an
injunction was granted on the multiplicity of suits ground; Electric Construc-
tion Co. v. Heffernan, 34 N. Y. St. Rep. 436, 12 N. Y. Supp. 336 (1890).
' See note 45, supra.
' See In re Seymour, 124 U. S. 200, 221, 8 Sup. Ct. 482 (1888) ; Blair v.
Sup. Council, 208 Pa. 262, 57 Atl. 564 (1904).
' Cf. Watson v. Hunter, 5 Johns. Ch. 168, 169 (N. Y. 1821). Statutory
replevin where defendant is insolvent might be an adequate remedy.
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mately to be reached, create a fundamentally different prob-
lem. We cannot always necessarily say in this situation, as
in the case of injunctive relief against torts, or as is some-
times true in injunctive relief against breaches of contract,
for example to render personal services, that no one will be
injured by the granting of the relief. The pivotal inquiry is
not whether the defendant has property, but whether he has
property which other creditors could subject to the payment
of their claims by the ordinary processes of the law other
than specific performance.54 If for example the defendant is
judgment-proof, with no property on which creditors can
levy execution, the fact that he has property which is exempt
either under the state debtor and creditor laws or under the
Federal Bankruptcy Act,55 is of merely academic interest to
other creditors. Under such circumstances no one will be
prejudiced by the specific enforcement of the debtor's con-
tract with the plaintiff.
Professor George L. Clark points out 6 that there are
other situations where this same result is reached; for ex-
ample, where for any reason the defendant cannot be peti-
tioned into involuntary bankruptcy, or perhaps where for
practical reasons it would be extremely unlikely that his
other creditors would file a petition, because of the relatively
high cost of administration, the small amounts of the claims,
or the smallness of the probable dividend. Such cases are,
however, of course exceptional. In the usual situation, where
the debtor's property is subject to execution and where a
petition in bankruptcy could and might well be filed, we are
confronted squarely with the problem of the relative impor-
'Henry v. Whidden, 48 Fla. 268, 269, 37 So. 571 (1904); WILLISTON,
op. cit. supra note 6, § 1420.
'In re Ferguson, 95 Fed. 429 (S. D. N. Y. 1899) ; if such is the situation
the debtor is not subject to attack. it re Chapman, 99 Fed. 395 (N. D. Ga.
1900) (as, e.g., a mortgagor's equity of redemption which is not subject to sale
under execution in Missouri) ; Matter of Moark-Nemo Mining Co., 219 Fed.
340 (W. D. Mo. 1915) ; Vitzthum v. Large, 162 Fed. 685 (N. D. Ia. 1908);
First Nat. Bank v. Orten, 11 Okla. Cr. 80, 142 Pac. 1096 (1914) ; 2 COLLIER,
BANKRUPTCY (13th ed. 1925) 1277, n.136. Exempt property constitutes no
part of the bankrupt's estate, In re Oleson, 110 Fed. 796 (N. D. Iowa 1901),
2 COLLIER, supra, § 70 (a) at 1744, and does not pass to the trustee. Exemp-
tions are created by state law. Lockwood v. Exchange Bank, 190 U. S. 294,
23 Sup. Ct. 751 (1902).
See Clark, Some Problems in Specific Performance (1917) 31 HARV. L.
REv. 271, 276.
[ VOL. 13
EFFECT OF INSOLVENCY
tance of the equities of the plaintiff and of the other creditors.
In this connection there is no longer any significance in the
distinction between unique and non-unique chattels, since in
neither case is the legal remedy adequate. On the other hand,
if insolvency is a bar in the case of non-unique chattels, the
same bar will be encountered in seeking the specific perfor-
mance of contracts to sell unique chattels. On this problem
the courts have reached different conclusions which fall pri-
marily into two classes: one, that the presence of insolvency
requires that the equitable jurisdiction be exercised; 57 the
other, that insolvency is a ground for declining equitable
jurisdiction and refusing specific performance. 58
THE PoLICY op THE FEDERAL BANKRUPTCY ACT.
The view has been expressed by various writers, led by
Professor Williston,59 that the enforcement of contract rights
Cf. Hurley v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. R., 213 U. S. 126, 29 Sup. Ct. 466
(1908).
'City Fire Ins. Co. v. Olmsted, 33 Conn. 476 (1866); see Chafee v.
Sprague, 16 R. I. 189, 13 Atl. 121 (1886); (1921) 34 HARV. L. REv. 309.
. Professor Williston in his works on SALES, Section 144 and on CoN-
TRACTS, Section 1420 (the erratum in the 1920 edition at line 9 of p. 2527
where the word "from" was inadvertently omitted, changing the sense
considerably, has been corrected at page 3964 of the 1937 edition) argues
that since the Bankruptcy Act does not forbid an insolvent to make a transfer
of his assets for a return honestly bargained for as an equivalent, there is no
objection to the performance by him of a fair executory contract, or to the
enforcement of it by a court of equity; but that if the insolvent had already
received the whole or part of the consideration, subsequent performance by
him could never be justified on the ground of insolvency, since in bankruptcy
an insolvent's obligations by way of mere contract must be sharply distinguished
from his obligations to surrender specific property where the legal or equitable
ownership is in another; so that if the bankrupt has been paid in advance, a
subsequent delivery within the four-month period would be a preference, and a
decree of specific performance because of insolvency would order the debtor to
do something the Bankruptcy Act has forbidden him to do. Cf. RESTATE ENT,
CONT=ACTS (1932) § 362, comment c, incorporating the above views. It may
well be asked, however, with all deference to the great authority supporting the
statement, why, if it would not violate the policy of the Act for equity to order
specific performance of a wholly executory "fair" contract made "in good
faith", it would violate its policy to order the enforcement of the contract if the
insolvent has already received "the whole or part of the consideration". WILLs-
TON, op. cit. mpra note 2, § 144 at 271. Is this not preeminently a case of sacri-
ficing substance to form? No equitable lien, of course, attaches in favor of one
who has contracted to purchase even a unique chattel; see WiLLISTON, supra,
§ 602; cf. Pusey v. Pusey, 1 Vern. 273 (1684); Onondaga Nation v. Thatcher,
53 App. Div. 561, 65 N. Y. Supp. 1014 (4th Dept. 1900), aff'd, 169 N. Y. 584,
62 N. E. 1098 (1901) : "If adequate reasons exist for specific performance, the
Bankruptcy Act is in no sense a bar." WALSH, op. cit. supra note 38, at 321.
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by permitting specific performance against an insolvent de-
fendant would directly violate the policy of the bankruptcy
statute, itself the expression of an equitable policy, and
should for that reason be refused.60 In view of the authorita-
tive nature of the foregoing expressions of opinion, a some-
what detailed examination of the statute is warranted. That
the purpose of the Act is to secure the equal distribution of
the debtor's assets among all creditors of each class, is axio-
matic. 61 The Act itself has, however, created certain stan-
dards by which such equality of distribution is to be judged.
At the outset of this part of the discussion certain distinc-
tions must be observed.
A preference is of course viewed from two angles; as an
act of bankruptcy, and as a voidable transfer of the debtor's
property.62  From the first point of view, an intent to prefer
is requisite; 63 from the latter, merely, reasonable ground for
belief by the creditor that the debtor was insolvent at the
time of the transfer is necessary. Only such transfers, more-
over, as diminish the debtor's estate, fall within the prohibi-
The framework of Professor Williston's theory is incorporated in his
phraseology of RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) § 362: "Specific enforcement
will not be decreed if the performance required will constitute a preference of
one creditor over others that is inconsistent with the purpose of an existing
bankruptcy statute or of other rules of law governing the distribution of
insolvent estates. In cases where the performance required will not constitute
such a preference, the existing or prospective insolvency of the defendant will
be considered in determining the adequacy of the remedy in damages." The
section is, however, phrased with such admirable restraint as to permit the
equity court to decree specific performance if such a result would not violate
the purpose of the Bankruptcy Act.
o See cases cited note 58, supra.
1 Wilson v. City Bank, 17 Wall. 473, 480 (U. S. 1873); 1 REMINGTON,
BANKRUPTCY (1934) 18.
" Note that the creation of the lien of a conditional vendor, even though
possession changed, is not a transfer of such property. Bailey v. Baker Ice
Machine Co., 239 U. S. 268, 36 Sup. Ct. 50 (1915), aff'g, 209 Fed. 603 (C. C.
A. 8th, 1913). For a factor's lien to be effective, it is absolutely necessary
that the property consigned be delivered to the consignee. Ommen v. Talcott,
188 Fed. 401 (C. C. A. 2d, 1911). Similarly, a pledge must be delivered, to
give rise to a lien. Matter of Sullivan Co., Inc., 247 Fed. 139 (N. D. N. Y.
1918), aff'd, 254 Fed. 660 (C. C. A. 2d, 1918) ; Matter of Imperial Textile Co.,
255 Fed. 199 (N. D. N. Y. 1919). Delivery may be symbolical (e.g., set aside
and earmarked), Ward v. First Nat. Bk., 202 Fed. 609 (C. C. A. 6th, 1913).
' U. S. BANKRUPtCY LAW, 52 STAT. 844, 11 U. S. C. A. § 21 (Supp.
1938)_ Section 96 is a definition when applied to a transaction voidable under
Section 21.
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tion of the statute,64 and the test of diminution is two-fold;
first, whether the allegedly preferred .reditor receives a
greater percentage of the estate than other creditors,65 and
secondly, in case there are different classes of creditors,
whether, as among other creditors of the same class, such an
undue advantage results from the transfer. Section 60 of
the Act is the section which deals with preferred creditors.66
The Act itself, although nowhere defining classes of creditors
eo nomine, refers in Sections 56-b, 57-e and 57-h, to holders
*of liens; in Section 64 to claims for wages, taxes, and debts
owing to any person who, by the laws of the United States,
is entitled to priority, and, generally throughout the statute,
to general creditors. These are the kinds of classes meant by
the Act. 7 Where there is only one creditor of a class, as for
example a distraining landlord, there can be no question of
his being preferred within his class.68 Preferences through
legal proceedings are dealt with in Sections 60 and 67.
Creditors entitled to priorities, preferred creditors and
secured creditors are terms of art in the statute. Secured
creditors are those having liens on assets of the debtor. Pre-
ferred creditors are those who have received preferences,
whether voidable or not; and creditors entitled to priority
of payment are merely, as their name implies, general credi-
tors who are in different strata of preferment, as to the pay-
ment of their claims, from other dissimilarly created credi-
tors. Priority does not refer to liens.6 9
Continental & Comm. T. & Say. Bk. v. Chi. T. & T. Co., 229 U. S. 435,
33 Sup. Ct. 829 (1913); New York County Nat. Bk. v. Massey, 192 U. S. 138,
24 Sup. Ct. 199 (1903).
'Palmer v. Brown, 297 U. S. 227, 56 Sup. Ct. 450 (1936); 2 CoLL.R,
op. cit. supra note 55, § 1288.
.U. S. BANKRuPTcY LAW, 52 STAT. 869, 11 U. S. C. A. § 96 (Supp. 1938).
Preference means a resultant inequality between creditors of the same class.
Matthews v. Hardt, 79 App. Div. 570, 80 N. Y. Supp. 462 (1st Dept. 1903) ;
Matter of Mandel, 127 Fed. 863 (S. D. N. Y. 1903); cf. In re Chadwick, 140
Fed. 674 (D. C. Ohio 1905) ; Christ v. Zehner, 212 Pa. 188, 61 Atl. 822 (1905) ;
Tilt v. Citizen's Trust Co., 191 Fed. 441 (D. C. N. J. 1911), aff'd, 200 Fed. 410
(C. C. A. 3d, 1912) ; Am. BK. DIG. (1916) § 488.
Preferences were not always repugnant to the policy of the insolvency
statutes. The modern doctrine that they are wrongs to other creditors was
first declared by Lord Mansfield in Worsely v. de Mattos, 1 Burr. 467 (1758),
and was not incorporated into our law until 1841.
' Swarts v. Fourth Nat. Bk., 117 Fed. 1, 6 (C. C. A. 8th, 1902).
'In re Belknap, 129 Fed. 646, 648 (E. D. Pa. 1904).
'Bird v. City of Richmond, 240 Fed. 545 (C. C. A. 4th, 1917) ; City of
Dallas v. Ryan, 62 F. (2d) 959 (C. C. A. 5th, 1933); It re Consumer's Coffee
Co., 151 Fed. 933 (E. D. Pa. 1907).
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THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN EQUITABLE LIENS AND THE
RIGHT TO SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.
In determining the effect of the defendant's insolvency
on the plaintiff's right to specific performance, certain dis-
Prior to the amendment on June 22, 1938 of Section 64 of the Federal
Bankruptcy Act, eliminating the provision in subdivision b (7) for the recogni-
tion of priorities created by state law, it might indeed have been contended with
considerable force that the Act expressly recognized whatever priorities (not,
of course, inconsistent with the express priority provisions of the Act) were so
created. Apart from legal verbiage, there is no doubt that the granting of
relief by way of specific performance, because of the very nature of the relief,
would constitute recognition by the state of the creditor's right as a prior one.
Prior to the amendment it had been held, construing former Section 64 b (7),
defining, as the last class of prior claims in the statutory hierarchy, debts owing
to any person who by the laws of the states or of the United States was entitled
to priority, that, although a different view had been expressed (6 REMINGTON,
op. cit. supra note 61, § 2857.70) the right need not be created by statute, but
might be "created" or "recognized", depending on our view of the theory of
judicial decision, by pronouncement of the courts. In re Newark Shoe Stores,
3 F. Supp. 293 (D. C. Md. 1933) ; State of Oregon v. Ingram, 63 F. (2d) 417
(C. C. A. 9th, 1933), cert. denied, 290 U. S. 630, 54 Sup. Ct. 49 (1933).
Moreover the decision of the highest state court was followed in determining
the nature of the state priority. State of Oregon v. Ingram, 63 F. (2d) 417
(C. C. A. 9th, 1933); Comm. of Pa. v. Stocker, 70 F. (2d) 453 (C. C. A. 3d,
1934). Where there was no decision, the bankruptcy court would follow
general rules of construction. Wintermore v. MacLafferty, 233 Fed. 95
(C. C. A. 9th, 1916). Such a recognition of state priorities was constitutional;
see 1 REMINGTON, op. cit. supra note 61, § 5.
Note the effect on the former rule, of Erie R. R. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S.
64, 58 Sup. Ct. 817 (1938), noted in (1938) 13 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 71, and
followed in Ruhlin v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 304 U. S. 202, 58 Sup. Ct. 860
(1938); Rosenthal v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 304 U. S. 263, 58 Sup. Ct. 874
(1938); N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Jackson, 304 U. S. 261, 58 Sup. Ct. 861 (1938);
Panko v. Endicott Johnson Corp. (N. D. N. Y. 1938).
The state law is followed as to the existence of liens. Lehman, Stern &
Co., Ltd. v. S. Gumbel & Co., Ltd., 236 U. S. 448, 35 Sup. Ct. 307 (1915).
Various priorities other than those resulting from the right of specific
performance had been granted by statute in some states; for example, claims
for materials furnished to manufacturing establishments, as in Mott v. Wessler,
135 Fed. 697 (C. C. A. 4th, 1905), In re Bennett, 153 Fed. 673 (C. C. A. 6th,
1907), In re Starks, 171 Fed. 834 (C. C. A. 6th, 1909) ; and see 6 REMINGTON,
op. cit. supra note 61, § 2857; fiduciary debts, In re Crow, 116 Fed. 110 (W. D.
Ky. 1902); and claims to community property, Int re Chavez, 149 Fed. 73
(C. C. A. 8th, 1906). The rule of former Section 64 b (7) did not, however,
prevent the application of Section 67 d (2), annulling liens obtained by legal
proceedings within four months prior to the filing of the petition. Globe Bank
v. Martin, 236 U. S. 288, 35 Sup. Ct. 377 (1914) ; 6 REMINGTON, op. Cit. supra
note 61, § 2849.
As to rights to specific property, however, even though not rising to the
dignity of an equitable lien, but on the other hand not acquired merely as the
result of greater diligence in bringing a legal proceeding, the only question
would seem to have been whether the state law recognized the creditor's right
as a prior one. Of course, even under the former statute, priorities as such
could be dealt with only by the bankruptcy court and not by the state court;
but the former recognition of priorities created by state law would appear to
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tinctions must be borne in mind. Holders of equitable rights
must be differentiated from holders of equitable liens, 70 and
holders of implied equitable liens, as for example a grantor's
lien, must be distinguished from holders of express equitable
liens.71 As to holders of equitable rights merely, the time-
honored distinction between rights and remedies, encoun-
tered so frequently in the fields of Conflict of Laws and of
Constitutional Law, becomes relevant in this connection also.
Before we can reach a conclusion upon our ultimate problem,
however, a further inquiry must, it will be evident, be di-
rected to the nature of the right of specific performance in
the case of contracts concerning chattels. Does the right to
obtain specific performance rest upon an equitable lien on
some specific property, or is it merely a right to obtain
specific property? And even if the latter, must the relief
necessarily fail as opposed to the policy of the bankruptcy
statute? Illustrating the distinction between the creation
of an equitable lien and a right to, specific performance gen-
erally, is the case of an agreement to give security, which
was not, even prior to the recent amendment of Section 64
have been an express statutory indication of a policy approving their creation,
since if the state could create a right of priority through recognizing the right
to specific performance, and if this right would have been recognized in the
administration of the bankrupt's estate, it would have been decidedly incongru-
ous for the federal court to authorize its trustee to bring an action to set aside
a transfer made pursuant to a state court judgment decreeing specific perform-
ance on the ground that complying with the decree would constitute a preference.
Since the amendment of Section 64 by the elimination of the recognition of state
priorities, however, the foregoing deduction of the policy of the Bankruptcy Act
is, of course, no longer permissible. The analysis is presented, however, in the
thought that the amendment eliminating state priorities is probably a conscious
or subconscious manifestation of the tendency towards the strengthening of
federal control of the administration of our commercial economy. Since it is
not inconceivable that the centrifugal forces may in time overcome the centrip-
etal ones observed during the last five years, a restoration at some future time
of the right of states to establish their own priorities might render pertinent the
foregoing analysis.
' An equitable lien to be valid must relate to some specific property.
Matter of Imperial Textile Co., 255 Fed. 199 (D. C. N. Y. 1919), citing
Grinnell v. Suydam, 5 N. Y. Super. Ct. 132 (1881); Porter v. White, 127
U. S. 235, 8 Sup. Ct. 1217 (1888); Willetts v. Brown, 42 Hun 140 (N. Y.
1886).
1 Smith v. Turner, 141 Ga. 313, 80 S. E. 993 (1914). An implied vendor's
lien cannot prevail as against intervening bona fide creditors without notice,
and, therefore, not against the vendor's trustee. Matter of Oswegatchie
Chem. Prod. Corp., 279 Fed. 547 (C. C. A. 2d, 1922) ; cf. Whalen v. Wolford,
96 Kan. 211, 150 Pac. 608 (1915).
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of the Bankruptcy Act, entitled to priorty,72 and an agree-
ment which has given rise to an equitable lien on specific
property, as setting aside in escrow for delivery to a pledgee,
within. the four-month period.7 3  If an equitable lien has
been created, it will be specifically enforced in bankruptcy34
THE QUESTION OF POLICY APART FROM THE EXPRESS
PROVISIONS OF FEDERAL BANKRUPTCY ACT.
On the question of whether the courts should incline to
an interpretation of the spirit or policy of the Act as forbid-
ding the granting of specific performance in the event of the
defendant's insolvency, a short and evasive answer might be
that the Act could speak for itself, but is silent as to any
such policy. On the question of policy apart from any indi-
cation of such statutory intent, there is no doubt but that
equity is not inclined to favor one creditor over others simi-
larly situated. Who has the greater equity? The other
creditors may have become such otherwise than through con-
tracts of purchase, as for example through contracts of em-
ployment, or loans, and may therefore not have acquired the
right to receive any specific property of the defendant. Will
the other creditors actually be benefited by equity's withhold-
ing from the plaintiff the relief of specific performance?
These are the questions, the answers to which, taken con-
jointly, should greatly assist in solving the problem. As to
who has the greater equity, a distinction might well be drawn,
based on sound principles of equity, as to whether the other
creditors would be unduly prejudiced by the granting of
specific performance. If the estate will not be diminished,
there is no problem under the Bankruptcy Act. Even if the
estate would be diminished, however, looking exclusively at
the element of delivery apart from the antecedent payment
of the purchase price, this factor is not necessarily of con-
Mechanics and Metals Nat. Bk. v. Ernst, 231 U. S. 60, 34 Sup. Ct. 22
(1914), aff'd, 201 Fed. 664 (C. C. A. 2d, 1913) ; see also Torrance v. Winfield
Nat. Bk., 66 Kan. 177, 71 Pac. 235 (1903).
'Sexton v. Kessler & Co., 172 Fed. 535 (C. C. A. 2d, 1909), azf'd, 225
U. S. 90, 32 Sup. Ct. 657 (1912).
' Foster v. Manufacturers' Finance Co., 22 F. (2d) 609 (C. C. A. 1st,
1927), cert. denied, 276 U. S. 633, 48 Sup. Ct. 339 (1927).
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trolling force in weighing the conflicting equities. The test
might well be whether or not other creditors have been mis-
led to their damage. If for example a purchaser has paid
the purchase price for the chattel, and the seller's other
creditors never knew of the seller's ownership, where would
be the injustice of allowing specific performance to the pur-
chaser, as is done in the case of land? But even if the pur-
chaser has not paid, a court of equity will of course grant a
decree only on condition of payment or adequate security
for payment. What the other creditors "lose" in such a
case, or rather what they are prevented from acquiring, is
the purchaser's profit in the transaction; but equity in rec-
ognizing the right to specific performance really recognizes
that the purchaser is entitled to his profit. Indeed there is
no objection even under the letter of the Bankruptcy Act to
granting specific performance where the contract is execu-
tory on both sides, since a transfer in good faith for fair
value presently received is not a preference. 75 The true
equities are more clearly discernable through an examination
of the situation where the purchaser has paid in full but has
not received the article contracted for. In this situation the
other creditors would be sharing in the profit which the pur-
chaser alone was entitled to derive from his contract; yet
anomalously enough, it is in such case, where the purchaser
has already paid for the goods but has not yet received them,
that his right to specific performance is most seriously ques-
tioned.7 6 The remarks of Dean Pound 77 on another aspect
of the problem are equally applicable here. "If the contract
is unilateral and defendant has the consideration, as it were,
in his pocket, insolvency of the defendant in the sense that
he is proof against execution, may be a strong ground for
exercising jurisdiction where ordinarily it would not be ex-
ercised."
But the injustice of the rule may well be even more ex-
treme. Suppose that the insolvent, instead of having the
purchase price of the undelivered goods "in his pocket", to
use Dean Pound's phrase, has paid other creditors, who there-
' See 1 WILLISTON, op. cit. supra note 6, § 1420.70 Ibid.
I Pound, sapra note 36, at 430.
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fore have it in their pockets. Would not the application of
the rule usually advocated require the courts to declare that
to be a preference in law which is not a preference in fact,*
because it has not diminished the insolvent's estate; and
would it not require the court of equity by withholding the
relief of specific performance, to really prefer over the ap-
plicant before the court, the other creditors who have been
paid in full out of the purchase price? True, the estate is,
in all of these cases, in form, diminished; but if we recognize
the purchaser's right to performance in kind, there is no
more actual diminution, looking at the transaction as a
whole, than where an equitable conversion of land has been
created. Substantive rights should not depend upon such fic-
tions as the doctrine of equitable conversion.
Is the substantive equity or right of the person who has
dealt with an insolvent any less because he has, instead of
buying land, sold it, thereby acquiring merely a grantor's
lien for the price? Or is it any less because instead of buy-
ing land he has bought personal property, the value of which
he may lose in part because of the seller's insolvency? Or is
it any greater than in a contract to give and receive security
because he has, through the setting aside in escrow of se-
curity to be pledged to him, acquired an equitable lien? In
recognizing the equitable right to specific performance gen-
erally, we are merely disregarding the fortuitous circum-
stance that an equitable lien has not been created.78 Where
liens need not be filed or recorded, they constitute in fact no
greater notice than do equitable rights of lesser dignity. Even
if the estate were really to be diminished, the answer to the
question as to whether the other creditors will be benefited
by the denial of specific performance is by no means clearly
in the affirmative. Perhaps there will be no bankruptcy;
perhaps the other creditors will never be paid at all; perhaps
the purchase price of the property will never go to them;
perhaps the plaintiff will prove to be the only unsecured
creditor.
" Where an equitable lien on specific property has been created, it, of course.
prevails in a subsequent bankruptcy proceeding, Sexton v. Kessler and Co., 172
Fed. 535 (C. C. A. 2d, 1909), aff'd, 225 U. S. 90, 32 Sup. Ct. 657 (1912);
In re McConnel, 197 Fed. 438 (N. D. N. Y. 1912); see also cases cited in 2
COLLIER, Op. cit. supra note 55, at 1253, n.42.
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It would therefore appear that it is by no means certain
that the object of the bankruptcy statute will be attained
by denying specific performance before a bankruptcy has oc-
curred. A possible theory, although one apparently never
suggested in the cases, would be to let the decree of specific
performance stand unless bankruptcy subsequently shortly
intervenes, staying execution, that is, for four months. Sec-
tion 67 (d) 2 might then operate to prevent the enforcement
of the decree.7 9  It is by no means clear equity that a liti-
gant before the court, concededly entitled to relief, should
be denied relief because others may possibly be prejudiced,
when he will certainly be prejudiced by a denial of his con-
ceded right.
The foregoing conclusion that the right to specific per-
formance of contracts concerning chattels may be recognized
even in insolvency, and that such recognition will not vio-
late the policy of the Bankruptcy Act, may be fortified by
illustrations derived from other heads of the law.
1. The equitable right of set-off in insolvency.80  This
right unquestionably operates to give the solvent
debtor of an insolvent creditor, having a counter-
claim against the insolvent, a greater percentage
than other creditors.
2. The right of specific performance of a contract for
the sale of land.81
3. In the field of Suretyship, the surety can set off the
claim of the principal debtor against that of the
creditor when the creditor is insolvent,8 2 although
not otherwise.8 3
z See note 68, supra.
Gerseta Trading Corp. v. Eq. Trust Co., 241 N. Y. 418, 150 N. E. 501
(1926).
The trustee in bankruptcy of an insolvent vendor will be required to
convey; CHArEE AND SIMPSON, op. cit. supra note 19, at 685.
'Coffin v. McLean, 80 N. Y. 560 (1880); Davidson v. Alfars, 80 N. Y.
660 (1880); Scroggin v. Holland, 16 Mo. 419 (1852); Springfield Engine &
Thresher Co. v. Park, 3 Ind. App. 173, 29 N. E. 444 (1891); see ARANT,
SuRaTysiP (1931) 214: "If the principal is insolvent he seems to be entitled
to no consideration. But this should be true, irrespective of his insolvency,
because the principal owes his surety the duty to pay the creditors so that the
surety cannot be required to pay."
83 City of N. Y. v. Parker Vein S. S. Co., 21 N. Y. Super. Ct. 300 (1861);
Erven v. Wilbor, 208 Ill. 492, 70 N. E. 575 (1904).
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4. In the field of Partnership, when assets of a firm
and its members are in the possession of a court
for distribution, individual creditors share first in
the individual assets even though those assets were
regarded by firm creditors prior to the bankruptcy
as an ultimate source of payment.84
5. Where the bankrupt has acquired property by
fraud, bankruptcy courts, under their equity
powers, always give in specie to the claimant of
personal property the property itself.85
6. If the purchase money has been paid in advance to
the insolvent seller, he will be required to deliver
the goods if an equitable lien had been created or
the money was to be held conditionally until de-
livery should be made, and a transfer within the
four months period is not preferential."0
7. A contract to give security,37 when property of the
insolvent has been set aside in escrow for the pur-
pose, is held to give rise to an equitabje mortgage
and is specifically enforced.""
8. "Where part of an entire contract relates to per-
sonal property, and the rest to a subject-matter,
such as land, over which equity jurisdiction may
ordinarily be exercised, specific performance may
be had of the contract as a whole, including the
clause relating to personal property." 89
'iN. Y. PARTNERSHIP LAW § 71(h) (added by Laws of 1921, c. 23). See
PRASHKER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON PARTNERSHIP (1933) 373, for a discus-
sion on partnership property and the individual property of the partners in the
possession of a court for distribution; see also Rodgers v. Meranda, 7 Ohio St.
180 (1857).
'In re Gold, 210 Fed. 410 (C. C. A. 7th, 1913); German Nat. Bk. v.
Princeton State Bk., 128 Wis. 60, 107 N. W. 454 (1906) ; see Horack, op. cit.
mtpra note 11, at 713.
13 REMINGTON, op. cit. supra note 61, § 1316.
See Sleeth v. Sampson, 237 N. Y. 69, 142 N. E. 355 (1923).
'Sexton v. Kessler & Co., 172 Fed. 535 (C. C. A. 2d, 1909), aff'd, 225
U. S. 90, 32 Sup. Ct. 657 (1912).
' 5 POMEROY, loc. cit. mpra note 1; 2 POmEROY, EQUITABLE REMEDIES (4th
ed. 1918) § 2171, at 4882, n.35. Accord: Leach v. Fobes, 11 Gray 506 (Mass.
1858); Kipp v. Laun, 146 Wis. 591, 131 N. W. 418 (1911).
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Perhaps the most authoritative expression of the policy
of the Bankruptcy Act is to be found in the decisions of the
federal courts, and it is particularly there that we find au-
thority for the conclusion that the policy of the statute does
not oppose the granting of specific performance against in-
solvent defendants.
In Mills v. VirginiaCarolina rn Lmber o.90 a delivery
of lumber was made by an insolvent, the lumber having been
paid for in advance under a contract for the whole output
of a planing mill. The buyer's proof of claim was objected
to by the trustee on the ground that the buyer had received
a preference in accepting the lumber. The proof of claim
was allowed, on the ground that the transfer was not a pref-
erence. The basis of the rule is more fully explained in
Templeton v. Kehler, 9 where the defendant contracted for
the purchase of cattle, paying part of the purchase price in
advance. The seller, while insolvent, and within four months
prior to the filing of the petition, delivered the cattle. A
settlement of the balance due was agreed upon and the agreed
amount was paid. The trustee sued to set aside the delivery
of the cattle as a preference. The court directed a verdict
for the defendant, (although a jury had found for the plain-
tiff), on the ground that the purchaser was not the insol-
vent's creditor, whose claim had been preferred by the de-
livery, but his debtor, the delivery and the payment of the
compromised balance of the purchase price being, not the
payment of a debt by delivering cattle, but merely the com-
pletion of an executory contract of sale. The transaction was
looked at, properly, as a whole,la and not merely from the
viewpoint of that part of it which consisted of the delivery
of the cattle and the payment of the balance of the purchase
price.
164 Fed. 168 (C. C. A. 4th, 1908).
173 Fed. 575 (E. D. Pa. 1909).
0'a Compare the reasoning in Bridgers v. Hart, 200 N. C. 685, 158 S. E.
242 (1931), where the court held that it was a question for the jury whether
or not the advancement of money by a corporation's president for traveling
expenses, and the corporation's repayment after his return, at a time when the
corporation had become insolvent, should be regarded as a single transaction,
under which view the subsequent repayment of the advances would not consti-
tute a preference.
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The Mills and Templeton cases are explained in the sec-
ond edition of "Remington on Bankruptcy", Section 1316, as
falling within the exceptions, to what is there stated to be
the general rule, such as cases where either title has passed,
or an equitable lien has been created, or the purchase money
has been held in escrow as a separate fund pending delivery.
Obviously none of these exceptions, however, were applicable
to the situation in either case. In the fourth edition of Mr.
Remington's work, published seventeen years later, the Tem-
pleton case is cited at Section 1692 together with Gage Lum-
ber Co. v. MeEldowney 92 (where the same result was reached
on the ground of the creation of an equitable lien) as author-
ity for the statement that "Where a purchaser from the
bankrupt has paid partly in advance, the delivery of the
goods purchased has been held not to be a preference, if the
transaction is bonw fide, for the purchaser is not a 'creditor',
but is, rather, a debtor for the balance due." In this edition
no attempt is made to reconcile the Templeton case with the
rule stated later in the same paragraph that "such could not
be the rule unless title to the goods had already vested in
the purchaser or there were some equitable lien thereon in
the purchaser's favor, since, if it were simply a payment in
advance, then the purchaser was a creditor to the amount
theretofore paid, the bankrupt fulfilling his obligation by
delivery of goods instead of money." The only authority
cited for the latter statement is a suggested comparison of
the case of Willen v. Hehillieui,93 which proceeded on the
theory that the article contracted for in that case, flour, had
been physically set aside in a warehouse, out of the insolvent
seller's control, which vested title in the purchaser as against
the seller's trustee in bankruptcy. The warehouseman was
obviously the purchaser's bailee, and the case is readily dis-
tinguishable for the foregoing reasons. The author appears
therefore in 1934, the date of the fourth edition, to regard
the Templeton case as expressing the settled law, and the
contrary rule, which he regards as the more desirable, as not
resting on well-established authority. The attempt to dis-
tinguish, in such situations, between whether the buyer under
'207 Fed. 255 (C. C. A. 6th, 1913).
285 Fed. 12 (C. C. A. 5th, 1922).
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an executory contract is the seller's debtor or creditor, that
is, whether the seller is the debtor of the buyer or the buyer
is the debtor of the seller, suggests inquiries such as whether
a squirrel is running around a man who is, within the squir-
rel's orbit, walking around a tree, or whether a man is stand-
ing in front of a wall or the wall is standing behind the man.
When we reach such a point of inquiry we might well turn
in desperation to the maxim that equity looks at the sub-
stance and not at the form; 94 and the substance of the trans-
action is that a buyer who has paid "even" wholly in advance,
has not in the net result depleted the insolvent's estate by
accepting delivery of the article purchased.
In Hurley v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry..95 although the
United States Supreme Court uses the language of equitable
mortgage, the case involved from any point of view either a
contract for the sale of coal to be mined or a contract to give
security for a loan, neither of which situations would create
an equitable mortgage; yet the trustee, having assumed the
lease of the mine, was required to mine and deliver to the
buyer sufficient coal to cover its advances. It is interesting
to note that Mr. Justice Holmes concurred in the judgment,
without opinion, from which we may permissibly infer that
he agreed with the result although not with the reasoning
upon which it was based. The case has been frequently cited,
always with approval 9 6 The state courts of Illinois, Idaho,
Massachusetts, Wisconsin, Oregon, Maryland and Alabama
have adopted the same conclusion as was reached in the
Templeton case.9 7  The New York courts are pursuing a
o" This maxim is used in connection with the very problem in Hurley v.
Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 213 U. S. 126, 24 Sup. Ct. 466 (1908).
See note 94, supra.
The most recent citation is in In re South Shore Co-operative Ass'n, Inc.,
23 F. Supp. 743 (W. D. N. Y. 1938).
%r See Parker v. Garrison, 61 Ill. 250, 253 (1871): "What had the com-
plainant in the way of any adequate remedy at law? Garrison was insolvent.
Any recovery of damages against him would have been worse than .useless, as
it would only have entailed upon the complainant an additional loss in the form
of a bill of costs." Dilburn v. Youngblood, 85 Ala. 449, 5 So. 175 (1888)
(dictum) ; Ridenbaugh v. Thayer, 10 Idaho 662, 80 Pac. 229 (1905) ; Ames v.
Witbeck, 179 Ill. 458, 53 N. E. 969 (1899) ; Sullivan v. Tuck, 1 Md. Ch. 59, 63
(1847); Clark v. Flint, 22 Pick. 231 (Mass. 1839); Livesley v. Johnston,
45 Ore. 30, 39, 76 Pac. 13, 946 (1904); Livesley v. Heise, 45 Ore. 148, 76
Pac. 952 (1904); Avery v. Ryan, 74 Wis. 591, 600, 43 N. W. 317 (1889)
(dictum).
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course which may perhaps be most accurately described as
stumbling in the right direction."
'The course of the few decisions of the New York courts has been far
from uniform, although a prediction as to future development may be ventured.
Zimmerman v. Gerzog, 13 App. Div. 210, 43 N. Y. Supp. 339 (2d Dept. 1897)
was an action to enjoin a breach of a contract by defendant, who had sold his
business to plaintiff, not to compete with him. The contract contained a pro-
vision for liquidated damages in the event of a breach, but the complaint alleged
that the defendant was insolvent. The court held the provision for liquidated
damages inapplicable, and granted the injunction. In its opinion the court
remarked that "even were the remedy limited to the recovery of liquidated
damages, it is quite probable that equity would enjoin the vendor, if he were
insolvent, until the damages were paid." The case, of course, althofigh the
injunction in effect required specific performance of the contract, falls within
the easy field of cases where, since the provisions for the sale of the business
had been fully executed by the insolvent, the granting of the particular relief
requested could not harm his other creditors, and therefore casts little light on
our problem.
In Petrolia Mfg. Co. v. Jenkins, 29 App. Div. 403, 51 N. Y. Supp. 1028
(1st Dept. 1898), the contract, for the manufacture and sale of soap sufficient
for plaintiff's requirements, appears to have been executory on both sides at the
time of the action. An injunction against breach of the contract was granted,
the court saying, "There is no other valid objection to an action for specific
performance. Plaintiff should not be remitted to an action at law for many
reasons. It is sufficient to mention the insolvency of the defendant Jenkins."
In Blank v. La Montaigne, 123 Misc. 238, 205 N. Y. Supp. 45 (1924)
specific performance was denied because the legal remedy for breach of the
contract was deemed adequate. The court regarded the insolvency of the
defendant as of no consequence, saying, "The ability to bring an action and
recover judgment determines the adequacy of the legal remedy, irrespective of
the ability to collect the judgment." The force of the decision as opposed to
the granting of specific performance in case of insolvency is, of course, greatly
weakened because the opinion was predicated on the old view of adequacy,
subsequently discarded. See note 30, supra.
An indication of the trend of the New York opinions may be obtained
from Halstead v. Schnitzpahn, 152 N. Y. Supp. 561 (1915), a decision by
Woodward, J., at a Special Term of the Erie County Supreme Court, where
the court vacated a temporary injunction restraining defendant from violating
a contract to sell certain patented mechanical devices to the plaintiff, on the
expressed ground that the difficulty of establishing the measure of damages, the
invention being new and untried, did not, in the absence of any allegation of
defendant's insolvency, establish irreparable injury. In Fox v. Fitzpatrick,
190 N. Y. 259, 82 N. E. 1103 (1907), the court in denying specific performance
of an agreement for the sale of trees, some standing and some cut, because the
damages could readily be calculated, had stressed the fact of the solvency of
two of the defendants; "Ball and Sherman were insolvent, so that a right of
action against them was of no value, but both the milling companies were
solvent."
Doty v. Doty, 171 N. Y. Supp. 852 (1918), a decision of the Special Term
of Schoharie County, although not a case of specific performance, involved the
same principle. There plaintiff's husband, after deserting her, had agreed to
and did provide her with a lot and house. The house burned, and the husband
refused to rebuild or furnish another house, and claimed the proceeds of the
fire insurance policy as his individual property. The action was to enjoin the
insurance company from paying the fire loss to the husband. The court dis-
missed the complaint. "While the plaintiff in her complaint alleges that she
has no adequate remedy at law, she nowhere alleges that the defendant, Job
Doty is insolvent. * * * The damages are clearly ascertainable, and may be
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The learned editor of the fourth edition of Pomeroy's
"Equity Jurisprudence", speaking of specific performance of
contracts for the sale of ordinary chattels, states9 9 that "it
is believed that in no case has insolvency alone been the
ground for relief", although he adds that a few cases contain
contrary dicta. Of the cases dismissed as dicta, however,
there are some which base the granting of relief solely on the
ground of insolvency.100 The rule is based by the editor of
the fourth edition on two stated grounds: first, because the
purchaser would be made a preferred creditor, and second,
because inadequacy is to be judged from the nature of relief
by way of damages in cases of a certain type, not from the
difficulty of collection of damages in the individual instance.
The grounds stated in justification of the rule are those
usually urged in its support. The latter of these objections
will certainly not appeal to jurists of the functional school
in these days of realism in law and living; the former objec-
tion is subject to possible rebuttal, by demonstration that the
'recognition of the superior equities of the plaintiff will not
contravene the policy of the Federal Bankruptcy Act as ex-
pressed in the Act and in the decisions of the federal courts
themselves.
The conclusion that specific performance should be
granted against an insolvent seller in all cases is by no means
a logically inevitable, or even ethically essential sequitur
from the foregoing discussion. In the opinion of the writer
it is an equitable doctrine, and logically permissible with
proper regard for the requirement of coherence in judicial
theory.
RALPhi A. NEWMAN.
St. John's University School of Law.
enforced in an action at law." If the defendant Job Doty had been insolvent
his creditors would certainly have been interested in obtaining the proceeds of
the insurance policy, and the injunction would have diminished the fund avail-
able for their claims; yet the court's dictin is that only in that circumstance
would it have considered granting the injunction.
5 Po mOY, op. cit. supra note 1, § 2171, at 4882, n.35.
See particularly Doloret v. Rothschild, 1 Sim. & St. 590 (1824) note
argument of Mr. Sugden for the plaintiff that "any one £1,000 of stock is
exactly similar to another £1,000 of the same stock") ; Clark v. Flint, 22 Pick.
231 (Mass. 1829) ; see Horack, loc. cit. upra note 11; see note 97, mspra.
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